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Regulatory Abdication in Practice 
Cary Coglianese* 
 
 
“Meta-regulation” refers to deliberate efforts to induce private firms to create their own 
internal regulations—a regulatory strategy sometimes referred to as “management-based 
regulation” or even “regulation of self-regulation.” Meta-regulation is often presented as a 
flexible alternative to traditional “command-and-control” regulation. But does meta-
regulation actually work? In her recent book, Meta-Regulation in Practice: Beyond 
Normative Views of Morality and Rationality, Fiona Simon purports to offer a critique of 
meta-regulation based on an extended case study of the often-feckless process of electricity 
regulatory reform undertaken in Australia in the early part of this century. Yet neither 
Simon’s case study nor her book overall succeeds in undermining the rationale for using 
meta-regulation.  
In this review essay, I highlight the many limitations of Simon’s argument. I show how, in 
making existing scholarship her foil, Simon mischaracterizes what regulatory scholars 
have had to say about meta-regulation. Not only does Simon misleadingly make scholars 
out to be naïve and overly optimistic about what can be expected from meta-regulation, but 
she also ignores entirely the peer-reviewed empirical research that shows that meta-
regulation can work. She also misstates what existing work has to say about the 
mechanisms that can make meta-regulation effective. The most significant problem with 
Simon’s book, though, is that the case study she presents in her effort to criticize meta-
regulation theory does not actually describe a strategy based on meta-regulation. Rather, it 
shows Australian electricity regulators as passive, defensive, and weak. What Simon’s 
book actually offers is a detailed case study of regulatory abdication in practice.  
  
 
* Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Pennsylvania, where he serves as the founding director of the Penn Program on Regulation. A published version of 
this essay appears in the Public Administration Review 79(5): 794-798 (2019).  
 2 
Regulatory Abdication in Practice 
Cary Coglianese 
 
Meta-Regulation in Practice: Beyond Normative Views of Morality and Rationality1 is an 
uncommon scholarly book written by a highly experienced practitioner. The author, Fiona Simon, 
holds a Ph.D. in criminology but the book draws primarily on her professional experience in 
government and industry during a pivotal period when Australia restructured its electricity sector 
to allow retail competition. Simon’s insider account offers a valuable cautionary tale about what 
can happen when government officials abdicate their responsibilities for solving regulatory 
problems. Without regulators’ willingness to collect and analyze evidence and then to make the 
necessary tough decisions, businesses will likely face uncertainty, consumers will lack adequate 
protection, and conflicts will fester.  
 
As indicated by the title of her book, Simon’s main interest lies with “meta-regulation.” In 
particular, she tells readers that her “book offers a critique of meta-regulatory theory, based on 
practice” (p. 14). That critique takes aim at what Simon characterizes as a “scholarly literature 
[that] proposes that meta-regulation is an efficient and effective response to the problems 
encountered by command and control regulation” (p. 227). She laments what she perceives as 
judgments that have “been made with little to no assessment of the regulatory costs and side effects 
of meta-regulation” (p. 227). Leveling charges of “naïveté” (p. 5; see also p. 227) and “wishful 
thinking” (p. 228), she argues that “many scholars merely observe that some regimes have meta-
regulatory characteristics….and then assume this must be good”—without adequately considering 
actual outcomes (p. 6).  
 
The basis for Simon’s critique is a case history of Australian electricity restructuring from 
1999 to 2015. The book traces a rocky path of policy development over electricity competition 
from its initial adoption in the state of Victoria to eventual retail competition throughout Australia. 
Much of the book attends to consumer protection issues, such as how electricity companies can 
respond when customers fail to pay their bills or whether those companies can rely on 
unscrupulous door-to-door sales staff to pressure consumers to switch their electricity providers. 
The book offers a rich narrative of policy processes too complex to summarize briefly but which 
will interest anyone who has lived through or studied any of the major infrastructure reforms that 
have occurred around the world in recent decades.   
 
As to Simon’s overall critique of meta-regulation theory, some empirically inclined readers 
may resist drawing inferences from a single case study. But the book’s more fundamental 
limitation is conceptual, centered on what meta-regulation means. 
 
The term “meta-regulation” may be unfamiliar to some readers, even those with a 
background or interest in regulation. Generally speaking, meta-regulation refers to deliberate 
 
1 In this essay, references to the book being reviewed—F. C. Simon, Meta‐Regulation in Practice: Beyond Normative 
Views of Morality and Rationality (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017)—are provided using page numbers in parentheses. 
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efforts to induce private firms to create their own internal regulations.21 Sometimes meta-
regulation has been referred to as management-based regulation (Coglianese & Lazer 2003) or as 
“regulation of self-regulation” (Parker 2002:245). This approach to regulation is often presented 
as a more flexible alternative to traditional “command-and-control” regulation. 
 
As a term of art, meta-regulation entered the mainstream of the regulatory lexicon in the 
1990s and early 2000s, when it began to be used by scholars in Australia.32 Although U.S. 
regulatory scholars have tended not to use the term much, its earliest use anywhere appears to have 
been in a paper published in the late 1970s by business management scholars in the U.S. 
(Govindarajan & Gupta 1979). Since at least the 1980s, scholars have written widely on different 
types of meta-regulation without necessarily using that precise term (e.g., Braithwaite 1982; 
Bardach & Kagan 1982; Gupta & Lad 1983; Orts 1995; Gunningham 1996; Hutter 2001). Today, 
meta-regulation is said to encompass an entire “family of ‘process-oriented regulation’ that 
mandates and monitors organizations’ self-evaluation, design, and management of their first-tier 
operations … and their second-tier governance and controls” (Gilad 2010). 
 
A concrete example of meta-regulation can be found in certain pollution prevention 
regulations adopted by more than a dozen U.S. states (Coglianese & Lazer 2003; Bennear 2006). 
These management-based regulations require companies using large quantities of toxic chemicals 
to develop internal plans for reducing their use of these chemicals. The rules do not require that 
firms actually reduce their use or emissions of toxic chemicals; they just require firms to engage 
in the development of their own internal plans and controls. The precise content of firms’ plans—
reduction targets, technologies, operational procedures—remains entirely up to the firms 
themselves. The role of the government regulator becomes one of overseeing firms’ internal 
planning processes—that is, of “steering and observing self-regulation” (p. 29).   
 
Why would regulators use meta-regulation rather than adopt their own performance or 
technology mandates? Private-sector managers possess superior knowledge of their firms’ 
operations, and meta-regulation seeks to leverage those managers’ ability to find better solutions 
to regulatory problems. Meta-regulation can sometimes “allow regulators to address problems 
when they lack the resources or information needed to craft sound discretion-limiting rules,” such 
as especially “when a regulatory problem is complex or an industry is heterogeneous or dynamic” 
(Coglianese & Mendelson 2010:152). With toxic pollution, for example, there are many more 
chemicals and industrial processes that use them than any real-world government regulator can 
understand well enough to regulate directly. 
 
Of course, meta-regulation is not perfect. Paradoxically, “the same flexibility that generates 
its advantages also presents its potential sources of policy failure” (Coglianese 2010). The chief 
weakness stems from a misalignment of incentives (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010:153). If 
intervention by a regulator is needed in the first place, that means private actors lack adequate 
 
2 Some scholars have used “meta-regulation” in an altogether different sense to refer to structural or procedural rules 
that constrain the work of regulators themselves (such as requirements to conduct regulatory impact analyses) (Morgan 
1999; Schuck 2000: 446, 459; Raedelli 2007). 
3 Christine Parker is perhaps best associated with use of “meta-regulation” in the sense relevant here, although she 
cites scholarship published in 1995 by Peter Grabowski in this connection (Parker 2002:245). Grabosky (1995:543) 
refers to “meta-monitoring” by regulatory authorities. 
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incentives to behave in a socially optimal manner. Just requiring self-regulation may not be enough 
because, “even though businesses have better information to find solutions to public problems, 
they do not necessarily have better incentives to do so” (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010:153).  
 
Drawing on the restructuring of electricity regulation in Australia, Meta-Regulation in 
Practice seeks to highlight meta-regulation’s limitations. Simon admits that “[t]he basic principles 
of meta-regulation have merit” (p. 5). But she takes issue with what she sees as scholars’ tendency 
to view meta-regulation through rose-colored glasses. She wants to leave the reader with “a 
discomforting but unsurprising conclusion: both meta-regulation and command and control 
regulation have their drawbacks, and these drawbacks may be impossible to eliminate” (p. 221). 
 
That conclusion is indisputable. Indeed, as I read Meta-Regulation in Practice, I found 
myself nodding in agreement with much of Simon’s skepticism, the same kind of skepticism 
evident in other scholarship highlighting the downsides of meta-regulation and other flexible 
regulatory approaches (e.g., Gunningham & Sinclair 2009; Black 2012; Akinbami 2013; Perrow 
2015; Coglianese 2017b). Still, Simon’s overall treatment of the regulatory literature gave me 
considerable unease. Her critique of that literature takes aim at too much straw. Anyone coming 
to this book without a familiarity with the existing literature on meta-regulation should be 
forewarned: regulatory scholars have been neither naïve nor Panglossian as Simon’s account 
makes them appear. 
 
Simon targets what she terms “normative meta-regulatory theory” (p. 6). “Normative” here 
takes on two meanings. The first is prescriptive, as when Simon writes: “The normative literature 
on meta-regulation implies that it is the best way to deal with highly complex regulatory problems. 
This book challenges these claims” (p. 4). Yet, I am unaware of anyone who has suggested that 
meta-regulation is always the best way to regulate complex problems. In support of her claim about 
the literature here, Simon refers in a footnote to only a single source. She makes clear in the 
footnote that this source actually indicates only that meta-regulation “may” be the best way to 
address certain problems (p. 17). She further indicates that the authors of this solely cited source 
themselves “note that meta-regulation and self-regulation may be ‘much less than ideal,’ also a 
theme of this book” (p. 17). Simon’s forthright presentation in her footnote is to her credit. But 
just a single source, and one that only says that meta-regulation may sometimes be the best option 
and that acknowledges that, even when the best choice, meta-regulation can still be far from 
perfect, fails to support the strong claim in her text. More importantly, it reveals the straw target 
Simon has created for herself.43  
 
The second meaning Simon gives to “normative meta-regulatory theory” is an explanatory 
one. In a chapter entitled “The Implicit Assumptions Underpinning Normative Meta-Regulatory 
Theory,” Simon suggests that scholars posit that the causal mechanism underlying meta-regulation 
involves changing the values held by business managers (pp. 21-48). Such normative change is 
apparently supposed to come about through a kind of consciousness-raising that occurs when 
managers engage with meta-regulators and other third-party actors. Such engagement with “the 
values and behaviour of its range of stakeholders, including consumers and other transactional 
 
4 In full disclosure, I co-authored the single source that Simon cited in this footnote. My co-author and I wrote that 
“meta-regulatory strategies may be the best available options under certain circumstances, but, nevertheless, they may 
turn out to be still much less than ideal” (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010:153). 
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stakeholders through the market … is expected to create in the business [manager] a desire to self-
regulate in the public interest” (p. 23; see also pp. 24-25). Managers might also strategically adopt 
socially responsible values out of concern about reputational harm or a loss of “social license” (p. 
3, 40). Either way, “the defining thesis of meta-regulatory theory,” Simon asserts, is that “norms 
[will] be internalised by businesses through the market and the involvement of special interests 
(politics)” (p. 212-213). 
 
For Simon, the key problem with this explanatory account is that it does not fit the real 
world—or certainly not the world of Australian electricity reform that she experienced. Private-
sector managers think in terms of profit-making, not the public interest. Any “genuine culture 
change would take years to be effective” (p. 217), and electricity companies do not seem bothered 
by the possibility of reputational harm (p. 206). Furthermore, what counts as the “public interest” 
is frequently contested (p. 46, 197). Even different Australian consumer groups differed in their 
views of how electricity companies should respond to customers who cannot afford to pay their 
bills (pp. 88, 151, 197).  
 
All fair enough. But anyone coming to Meta-Regulation in Practice with knowledge of the 
relevant research will find it difficult to see the explanatory account that Simon critiques as 
anything but a caricature, at best. It is telling—and, again, to Simon’s credit—that she speaks of 
normative change as only an “implicit assumption” behind meta-regulation. But such an 
assumption is far from necessary—and thus not implicit. Standard explanations grounded in firms’ 
self-interest can explain responsiveness to meta-regulation (Reinhardt 2000; Bennear 2006; 
Coglianese & Nash 2016). Nothing hinges on meta-regulation needing to provoke a “change in 
corporate morality” (p. 216). 
 
But can meta-regulation actually work? Simon suggests that scholars have overlooked this 
question. She claims that “there is little evidence of the success of meta-regulation in practice” (p. 
21), and that it is even “unclear how we might test the effectiveness of meta-regulation” (p. 6). Yet 
Bennear (2007) has provided a difference-in-differences analysis showing that firms in states with 
pollution prevention planning laws achieved relative reductions in toxic pollution of about 30%. 
Similar statistical analysis reveals that meta-regulation is associated with a reduction in certain 
foodborne illnesses (Minor & Parrett 2017). An extensive body of research has evaluated voluntary 
programs established by regulatory agencies to promote self-regulation (Coglianese & Borck 
2009). To be sure, one must not overstate what the literature shows: not only is more research 
needed, but meta-regulation is far from reliably effective (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010). Still, a 
reader of Simon’s book misses even the available research that seeks to evaluate meta-regulatory 
strategies—research showing that they can sometimes work.  
 
The biggest conceptual problem underlying Meta-Regulation in Practice is that its case 
study of Australian electricity restructuring appears actually not to be a case of meta-regulation at 
all. Government officials did not so much pursue meta-regulation as they just punted on many key 
decisions. The reader is told that the Victorian government initially decided to move toward retail 
competition merely by setting a date when the existing laws on monopoly electricity service would 
lapse (p. 59). Any policies needed to structure a competitive retail environment were “non-
existent” (p. 58). The government “provided no direction for the industry” (p. 59).  As a result, 
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“[t]he industry as a whole seemed confused” and “no one seemed to know what was required of 
the business or of the market” (p. 61).  
 
Eventually, in the face of the impending date for lifting the law governing the old 
monopolistic system, a state regulatory authority—the Essential Services Commission (ESC)—
stepped in and tried to broker a process for generating some ground rules for competition. But the 
ESC apparently took a light-touch approach, opting to try to work through a consultative process 
to craft rules satisfactory to different industry and consumer groups. As a result, ESC decisions 
“often meant trading off different stakeholders’ claims to arrive at some reasonable middle ground, 
and the ‘middle’ would shift depending on the weight of opinion” (p. 71; see also pp. 75, 203). 
Some ESC decisions were “only symbolic, provided to placate particularly strong stakeholder 
views” (p. 71).  
 
Regulatory decision-making throughout the rest of Australia apparently took a similar 
consensus-based trajectory: “There were probably between ten and 20 consultation processes in 
play across the issues and jurisdictions at any one time, with industry (and often consumer groups) 
expected to attend workshops and submit formal responses” (pp. 83, 85). Too often, “regulatory 
decision-making … relied on trading off assertions and finding middle ground” (p. 92).  Rather 
than a process driven by rigorous analysis, regulatory policies often derived from “anecdotes 
recounted to politicians” or from “small numbers of individual case studies” (pp. 93). 
 
What Simon describes looks not at all like meta-regulation but rather a lot like a regulatory 
free-for-all. Regulators appear to have structured their rule development process essentially as an 
open contest. They also appear to have acted defensively, worrying more about maintaining 
“legitimacy with … political masters” (p. 203) than about their responsibility to make high-quality 
decisions that deliver public value (Coglianese 2017a).  
 
Ironically, the end result appears not to have generated any notable self-regulation nor even 
the kinds of flexible rules associated with meta-regulation. To the contrary, in Victoria the 
“stakeholders’ pressure to codify their preferences resulted in a legalistic and detailed regulatory 
regime” (p. 71)—one that was “most onerous” (p. 116) and even “more legalistic than the 
regulations applying to the pre-[competition] environment” (p. 71). After the rest of Australia 
decided to move to retail electricity competition, the resulting national energy code turned out to 
be “a comprehensive regulatory regime with hundreds of pages of law and rules” (p. 99).    
 
Toward the end of her book, Simon concedes that “the industry was not enabled and 
incentivised to self-regulate to meet the public interest as expected by normative meta-regulatory 
theory” (p. 219, emphasis in original). Indeed, she admits that “Australian policymakers did not 
explicitly aim to develop a meta-regulatory framework for the energy retail sector… There was no 
debate about whether to pursue command and control regulation or meta-regulation. Instead, meta-
regulation developed naturally” (p. 220).  
 
But meta-regulation does not just develop “naturally.” It is not a set of “inchoate actions 
or proposals that may have the byproduct of motivating firms to self-regulate” (Coglianese & 
Mendelson 2010: 162). Rather, “[m]eta-regulation refers to ways that outside regulators 
deliberately—rather than unintentionally—seek to induce targets to develop their own internal, 
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self-regulatory responses to public problems” (Coglianese & Mendelson 2010: 150; see also 
Grabosky 2007:184; Black 2012:1046, 1048). Regulators cannot just passively go through the 
motions and then be said to have opted for meta-regulation. 
 
Simon’s real target, in the end, appears to be inadequate leadership by policymakers and 
regulatory officials. She reveals the underbelly of pluralist politics and the undesirable tendencies 
that can arise when key decision makers fixate on satisfying the “stakeholders” rather than 
pursuing regulatory excellence (Coglianese 2001; Coglianese 2003; Coglianese 2017a). With her 
illuminating insider account of Australia’s bumpy road toward electricity restructuring, Simon has 
offered readers not a critique of meta-regulation theory but of regulatory abdication in practice.  
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